Methodological Naturalism

 

Methodological Naturalism    

 

Rob Pennock’s Tower of Babel is partially a response to the confusion surrounding methodological naturalism and ontological naturalism. Chapter four, entitled Of Naturalism and Negativity, specifically addresses this confusion and Creationists who fall prey to these misunderstandings when talking about evolution. The key difference is that ontological naturalism is a philosophical position about what is and isn’t in the world, while methodological naturalism is a way to learn more about the world.  

Early in the chapter, Pennock points out how, historically, the term “naturalism” has had a wide variety of definitions: “Since the time of the ancient Greeks, naturalism has often been associated with various forms of secularism, especially epicureanism and materialism, but it has also been used as a label for religious views such as pantheism, as well as the theological doctrine that we learn religious truth not by revelation but by the study of natural processes” (Pennock 189). He adds a few sentences later that naturalism also became associated with logical positivism and phenomenalism in the twentieth century. The point is that “naturalism” does not have a universal definition, and therefore isn’t tied to specific ontological claims. One can be religious or irreligious, Christian or deist, scientist or construction worker and still be a “naturalist” in some sense of the word. The way Creationists use the term often falls back on what Pennock calls “metaphysical” or “ontological naturalism”, which “makes substantive claims about what exists in nature and then adds a closure clause stating ‘and that is all there is’” (Pennock 190). While ontological naturalists exist, and typically they are atheists, they do not have to be, as evidenced by Hobbes and Spinoza. All that is required is a general statement that nature is all that exists. Even ontological naturalism – a legitimate philosophical position and not a methodology – does not require one to give up their religious beliefs (at least not all of them).  

On the other hand, methodological naturalism “does not make a commitment directly to a picture of what exists in the world, but rather to a set of methods as a reliable way to find out about the world” (Pennock 191). This includes the methods of the natural sciences and, by extension, any conclusions they indirectly discover. Unlike ontological naturalism, knowledge gained from methodological naturalism is always tentative and open to revision should new evidence arise. For example, when we learned about evolution by natural selection, this changed the conclusions drawn from methodological naturalism. However, there were probably some ontological naturalists who remained ontological naturalists after this new discovery, because it was still explained within the confines of the natural world. The philosophical stance is different from the epistemological method. To make the distinction more explicit, one can be a methodological naturalist and believe in supernatural interference; Mature-Earth Creationists, for instance, believe that the Earth is about six thousand years old based on literal Biblical scripture, but accept that the scientific evidence points to an older Earth. In other words, God made the Earth “recently” by geological and astronomical standards, but He made it look old. One could, theoretically, be a Mature-Earth Creationist and a methodological naturalist if they accept that God made it seem like there are natural laws at work forever everywhere (although such an individual is incredibly rare in real life. I admit this view is extreme, but I use it anyway to better illustrate the point). Unfortunately, conflating philosophy and methodology is a common mistake, and Creationists do it so often that people like Pennock must write books like this in response.  

Most significantly, natural theories tend to provide more explanatory power than supernatural theories. As Pennock explains, “science is based upon a philosophical system, but not one that is extravagant speculation. Science operates by empirical principles of observational testing; hypotheses must be confirmed or disconfirmed by reference to empirical data. One supports a hypothesis by showing that consequences obtain which would follow if what is hypothesized were to be so in fact” (Pennock 195). It is important to reiterate that science doesn’t “prove” anything; all claims are tentative based on available evidence, and a theory or natural law provides value if it can make (correct) testable predictions. Supernatural theories don’t provide such value, because gods can make anything happen at their will; they can strike with lightning, create life, send hurricanes, or build planets “for some purpose”, regardless of whether their actions are consistent with our proposed natural laws. In other words, they are “unfalsifiable” explanations, because they can’t be proven wrong.  

Pennock makes this clear when he says that “allowing appeal to supernatural powers in science would make the scientist’s task just too easy, because one would always be able to call upon the gods for quick theoretical assistance” (Pennock 196). On the surface, that sounds like a good thing (it can be embarrassing to be proven wrong), but because such explanations can’t tell us with accuracy that is better than chance whether something will happen, they are useless. Again, one can be a methodological naturalist and still believe in gods or other supernatural entities. Although, since these explanations don’t have empirical evidence nor provide us with practical value, they tend to be dismissed by the natural sciences. Therefore, evolution is accepted while Creationism (and Intelligent Design) is rejected in science; not only does evolution have overwhelming evidence in its favor, but it allows us to make testable predictions that provide us with value for anatomy, medicine, psychology, zoology, history, and countless other fields. By contrast, Creationism can explain everything by saying that God created it. That may or may not be true, but it doesn’t provide any avenues for further research and discovery.  

Science and methodological naturalism are secular. This means they have nothing to do with religion; it does not mean that one is required to abandon their religion while using them, except as empirical explanations of natural, observable phenomena. This is based not on a commitment to ontological naturalism, but on the recognition that a supernatural explanation would be unfalsifiable and therefore wouldn’t provide us with much value beyond the experiment in question. I would be upset if we stopped teaching evolution in public schools, but I think it is far more important to drill this understanding into students of any science class. Science is not inherently against religion, but it is inherently in pursuit of truth and new knowledge, which can only happen if an idea can be subjected to rigorous testing.  

 

Works Cited 

Pennock, Rob. Tower of Babel. 1999.