Saint Anselm of Canterbury is well-known for his ontological argument, one of the most popular arguments for the existence of God. According to Anselm, God is defined as “something than which nothing greater can be thought” (Anselm 270). He starts with the premise that things are greater if they exist not only in understanding, but also in reality. Therefore, if God is something than which nothing greater can be thought, then that must mean He exists in reality. If He existed only in the understanding, then “it could be thought to exist also in reality – something which is greater [than existing only in the understanding]” (Anselm 271). To put it another way, imagine if we took everything in the universe and lined them up in order of greatness. At one end of the spectrum would be the least great thing, and at the other would be the greatest. That greatest thing is God. We may not know what that greatest thing is, but we know that it is out there – like how we know there is a fastest runner, even if we cannot name them. To its credit, the argument is straightforward and valid in its structure, but it has always struck me as an odd demonstration of something’s existence. After deeply reflecting on it, I have some greater clarity on the logical problems that it contains.
My first line of thinking was inspired by Plato’s Euthyphro Dilemma, which asks the following question: Are things pious because the gods command them, or do the gods command them because they are pious? The idea is that this question presents a double-edged sword; if things are pious because the gods command them, then that means piety is arbitrary and is logically equivalent to what the gods command. It leads to the tautological conclusion that the gods command what they command. On the other hand, if the gods command them because they are pious, then that means there is something out of their control. They do not decide what is right or wrong, which is problematic if one believes in omnipotent deities. Applying this logic to Anselm, I would revise Plato’s original question: Is God responsible for determining what greatness is, or is He not? If God is responsible for determining the meaning of “greatness”, then that means He is the “greatest” thing by standards that He created. On the other hand, if He is not responsible for it, then that means there are some things outside of God’s control – in this case, what constitutes as something “great”. This is a problem if one wants to use this argument to justify their belief in an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent God. However, if they find it satisfactory to say that God exists without adding any additional qualities, then it may be adequate. Although, I wonder whether Anselm would have been satisfied believing in a God without any known attributes.
Additionally, Anselm’s definition seems to imply that our thinking about God causes His existence. If this is true, then that implies that we are, in some sense, more powerful than God. If God’s existence depends on our ability to think, then this would seem to limit the idea of an omnipotent deity. On the other hand, if He exists regardless of our thinking about Him, then Anselm’s explanation of God isn’t a definition, but rather a quality. To illustrate this point, imagine if we lined up all things in the universe according to size, with atoms on one end and stars and black holes on the other. We could say that celestial objects are the largest things in the universe, but this would be an inadequate definition. Stars, for instance, are large spheres of hot gas and dust. Size is certainly a component, but it is not all that a star is. Likewise, I could say that my cell phone is something that exists both in the mind and in reality. This is a true statement about my phone, but it is not a proper definition. The ontological status of an object shouldn’t depend on whether we are able to think about the thing in question (except maybe thoughts), especially an all-powerful deity. However, if this is the case, then saying that God is “something than which nothing greater can be thought” is insufficient. This is a quality of God, but not a definition.
Another problem I have with Anselm’s argument is his reluctance to define “greatness”. When Anselm says that God is “something than which nothing greater can be thought”, I doubt that he is referring to size. I also don’t believe that he is talking about moral greatness – that is, things are better morally if they exist in reality. The only thing that seems to be consistent with his writings is ontological status – the idea that “greater” things are, by definition, things that exist in reality and not only in the understanding. A proper synonym might be Aristotle’s notion of “actuality”. To Aristotle, “potentiality” refers to the capacity or chance for something to occur, while “actuality” refers to the thing actually happening. Anything that is “greater” is actualized because it fulfills its role better than potentiality. In the same way that an actualized flower is “greater” than a potential flower, and an actualized knife is “greater” than a potential knife, an actualized God is “greater” than a potential God. Unfortunately, the only thing we can say about a God under this definition of “greatness” is that He exists. Similar to the problems explained earlier, this does not give us any indication about God’s qualities. God exists, but we still cannot say for sure what God is. Furthermore, it appears that if we want to consider God “greater” than the flower or the knife, then we must say that God’s “greatness” has to do with His actualization of “godliness”. In other words, saying that God is the “greatest thing” is the same thing as saying that God is the most “God-like” thing. This is clearly tautological, and it may be the basis for many critics’ claims that Anselm’s argument is circular.
Why does it matter if we cannot say anything about God, other than the fact that He exists? Shouldn’t that be enough? The issue is that many people, including those who find Anselm’s argument convincing, think of God as an interfering agent. He changes the course of events to fit His “plan” and reaches out to those who call for help. However, this is not supported by the ontological argument. Neither is the less demanding claim of deism – that God created the universe and then left it to its own devices. We cannot say, at least from this line of reasoning, that God is the basis for the existence of everything, nor can we say that He has a moral code for us to follow. He might care about us and other forms of life, or He might not, either because He is nonchalant or because He doesn’t have consciousness at all. We don’t know if God is made of matter or not; we don’t know if He is sensible or intelligible, or whether the dichotomy even applies to Him (as other medieval philosophers such as Pseudo-Dionysius have pointed out). It seems strange, based on the ontological argument alone, to dedicate significant time and resources towards the adoration or even worship of this supposed deity. For all we know, “God” is an asteroid in the middle of space, floating about helplessly with no will or intent. There may be other arguments that show God’s other qualities – goodness, knowledge, wisdom, power, justice, etc. – but this one simply isn’t enough to justify any traditional notions of theism.
To illustrate this point better, let’s return to the analogy of the fastest runner. As previously mentioned, we may not know who the fastest runner in the world is (at least I don’t), but we can rationally believe that such a person exists. What would be irrational is to suggest that we can know anything else about this person. We cannot say that they do or do not like junk food, television shows, or reading. We cannot say what country they are from, what their nationality is, or how much money they have. We cannot even say things about them that might seem obvious, like that they have two legs and train every day. Although I know little about sports, I am aware that some athletes wear prosthetic limbs or take cheat days once per week. It’s not even entirely clear that they like running; it is easy to imagine someone who runs to earn money for their family or to maintain a healthy body, not solely for pleasure. A quick search on the Internet may answer some of these questions, but my point is that the argument alone that a “fastest runner” must exist doesn’t tell us anything about such a person. Likewise, an argument demonstrating the existence of a “greatest thing” doesn’t tell us anything else about it.
It appears that Anselm’s argument, while valid in structure and easy to understand, does not tell us anything about God besides the fact that He exists. There is a “greatest thing” out there somewhere, but we don’t know what its attributes or capabilities are. It may be significantly different from most people’s notion of a personal deity with a plan for the universe and an afterlife waiting for us. The more credit we give to Anselm and the stronger we make the argument sound, the less we are able to say about this God in question.
Works Cited
Anselm. "Proslogion." Foltz, Bruce V. Medieval Philosophy: A Multicultural Reader. Bloomsbury Academic, 2019.