Parmenides’ argument regarding Being is airtight. If we assume that “nothing” does not exist, then there must be a single Being that is indivisible, immovable, unchangeable, was not created and cannot be destroyed. After all, if one were to divide, move, or change this being, what would be left in its place? It would have to be nothing, but we have already assumed that nothing does not exist! All change, therefore, is an illusion according to this argument. The world of Becoming is a collective hallucination, a misrepresentation of reality.
Of course, most of us find this conclusion absurd. Obviously, there is change in the world, so Parmenides must be wrong. But how? His beginning assumption seems perfectly reasonable: in his words, “that it is, and that it is not possible for it not to be” (Reeve and Miller 14). The logical steps he takes also seem valid. It may be that the only way to refute his argument is to refute the assumption. In other words, “nothing” must exist, in some way.
One possible alternative view of the world comes from the Atomists, who have been largely vindicated by scientists in the last few centuries. The first well-known proponent of Atomism is Democritus, who famously declared, “By convention [nomos] sweet; by convention, bitter; by convention, hot; by convention, cold; by convention, color; but in reality [phusis], atoms and void” (Reeve and Miller 34). According to Democritus, atoms are organized into a wide variety of shapes and patterns that affect our senses in precise ways. As a result, what we perceive as “change” is really atoms rearranging. Things are not “sweet,” “bitter,” “hot,” “cold,” or “colorful” in themselves, but they appear that way to us. While Democritus got some of the details wrong (it turns out that atoms are not indivisible), he got the basic idea right without the help of modern science. Impressive!
Atomism partially solves the Parmenidean problem. The “void” in Democritus’ model may be a refined understanding of the “nothingness” that Parmenides rejects. Consequently, when we see things being moved, changed, created, or destroyed, these are not violations of the nature of reality. Atoms simply collide and interact with each other in different arrangements, all while moving in the void. However, the problem is not fully addressed. To explain why, let’s take an example of atoms rearranging to create an observable change. When the molecules in solid ice move more quickly, the ice will melt into water. If they move even faster, then the water will evaporate into steam. Slowing down the atoms will reverse the process, transforming steam back into water and water into ice.
In order for the atoms to move at all, they must get from location one to location two. That is, they must stop existing in their current state, at least in terms of their location, and start existing in another state. How can this possibly occur? Part of Parmenides’ concern was that what-is-not cannot come from what-is, and vice versa. If that is the case for an overarching, omnitemporal and omnipresent Being, then surely that is also the case for atoms, right? This predicament doesn’t appear to be solved by the nature of movement. It is tempting to say that atoms change location by moving, but this doesn’t explain how moving is possible in the first place. Why would an atom stop existing at one point and then “reappear” at another point? Similarly, why would the velocity of the atoms change, transforming the ice into water, water to steam, and so on? Why would the property of having “velocity one” vanish in exchange for “velocity two”? There must be another element to the “what-is-not” that isn’t included in the void.
One possible element is time. According to one scholar’s analysis of Parmenides, “time presupposes the past and the future, each of which is included in what-is-not (now)” (Reeve and Miller 15). This sentiment reflects the A theory of time, in which the present is the only time that truly exists, while the past and the future do not. If the A theory of time is correct, then it must be possible to get something from nothing since time is constantly moving forward. Parmenides is not fond of this conclusion, so perhaps he would be more receptive to the B theory of time.
The B theory of time may be analogous to a movie made up of individual frames that, when isolated, are indistinguishable from normal photographs. Each moment in time is stacked against other moments around it that create the illusion of a smooth transition. Contrary to what Parmenides states, the past and the future exist as much as the present moment. They are part of the “what-is”, and when we say something like “this cup,” we really mean one part of the cup that extends through the fourth dimension of time in addition to the three dimensions in space.
However, this B theory of time also doesn’t explain change. Why would we “move” from one point in time to the next? The problem appears similar to traditional movement. In the same way that an atom moving from one spatial place to another seems to imply the existence of nothing, an atom moving through time appears to do the same under this model. Why would the present moment shift from one “part” of time to another? To do this, a past moment would have to be, in some sense, “abandoned,” and a future moment “adopted”. It is similar to “abandoning” location one and “adopting” location two. How could this change occur without what-is coming from what-is-not?
Whichever theory of time we accept, it appears that the Parmenidean problem is not entirely solved. Both involve something coming from nothing, or at least the implicit acceptance that “what-is-not” exists in some fashion. For thousands of years, philosophers have taken creation ex nihilo as a given impossibility. However, if we are to accept Parmenides’ logic and believe that change occurs, then it seems we have few other options. We must not only accept that it is possible for something to come from nothing, but that it happens all the time! It is the nature of change itself that requires this fact to be true. When we use physics to describe the orbits of celestial objects, we are implicitly skipping the step of “disappearing” and “reappearing” without realizing it! This doesn’t mean our knowledge of physics is wrong, but it is incomplete.
Parmenides’ argument is mind-boggling, but it is difficult to ascribe a specific logical fallacy to it. Unfortunately, he rejects the belief that his starting place – “nothing” does not exist - must be false in favor of the more absurd conclusion that the world of Becoming is an illusion. The Atomists were able to address some of the problems he brought up with their own theory, but even they do not account for how time works. Furthermore, neither the A nor B theory of time fill in all the remaining gaps. For these reasons, perhaps it is unwise to follow the strict philosophical rule that ex nihilo creation should be completely discarded.